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Ambivalence
J.S. Swindell
Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, USA
The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action.
Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the
phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon,
and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full
treatment in the context of action theory – providing an analysis of how it relates to
the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to
Frankfurt’s account, all revolving around the charge that his account contains a
serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I
then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt’s
analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal
conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of
ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and
demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and
methods of resolution of ambivalence.
Keywords: ambivalence; autonomy; Frankfurt; will; identification
1. Introduction
The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite
this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although
many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to
it,1 only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon a full treatment in the context of action
theory – examining how it relates to the structure of the will, freedom of the will, and
freedom of action. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt’s analysis of the phenom-
enon of ambivalence. I argue that his account contains an ambiguity between identification
and willing. I treat this ambiguity as a distinction, and then use it to develop an analysis of
the phenomenon of ambivalence that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities to which Frank-
furt’s analysis is prey. Throughout, I consider and rebut some preliminary objections to this
new analysis.
2. Frankfurt on ambivalence
Frankfurt has argued that the objects, people, courses of action etc., that we desire are
objects of first-order desires. We, as humans, have the ability to reflect on these desires
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and either want to have them or not want to have them – these desires about our first-order
desires are second-order desires. If, upon reflecting on a desire, we want to have it and we
want it to be effective in moving us to action, then it is our will (also referred to by Frankfurt
as a second-order volition), and acting freely consists in acting in accordance with our will
(Frankfurt 1988a, 14–6). According to Frankfurt, ambivalence occurs when there is a con-
flict during will formation. An ambivalent agent experiences conflict during the process of
reflecting on a desire that she has, and the conflict prevents her from forming a will, i.e.
from taking a position on whether it is a desire that she wants to have and to be effective
in action. Frankfurt’s exact words:
Ambivalence is constituted by conflicting volitional movements or tendencies. . . (Frankfurt
1999b, 99)
If there is an unresolved conflict among someone’s second-order desires, then he is in danger of
having no second-order volition; for unless this conflict is resolved, he has no preference con-
cerning which of his first-order desires is to be his will. (Frankfurt 1988a, 21)
He is inclined in one direction, and he is inclined in the contrary direction as well; and his atti-
tude toward these inclinations is unsettled. Thus, it is true of him neither that he prefers one of
his alternatives, nor that he prefers the other, nor that he likes them equally. (Frankfurt
1999b, 100)
Frankfurt differentiates ambivalence from other types of conflict that an agent may experi-
ence. One common type of conflict that an agent may experience is temptation. In the case
of temptation, the agent has taken a side about what desires she wants to have and to move
her to act (she has formed a will); and so the conflict is between her and the outlaw desires.
In ambivalence, however, the conflict is in the agent; for she has not taken a side; the agent
herself is torn. Frankfurt says, ‘. . .the person is not merely in conflict with forces “outside”
him; rather, he himself is divided’ (Frankfurt 1988b, 165). Another common type of conflict
that an agent may experience is a conflict of first-order desires. An agent may experience a
conflict at the first-order level (e.g. eating steak or a vegetarian meal for dinner), but to
qualify as a case of ambivalence, there would have to be a conflict at the second-order
level as well (e.g. the agent is conflicted about whether she wants her desire for pleasure
or her desire for health to be effective in action).
Frankfurt argues that the opposite of ambivalence is wholeheartedness. He says, ‘If
ambivalence is a disease of the will, the health of the will is to be unified and in this
sense wholehearted’ (Frankfurt 1999b, 100). And that wholeheartedness ‘. . . requires
that with respect to any such conflict, he himself be fully resolved. This means that he
must be resolutely on the side of one of the forces struggling within him and not on the
side of any other. Concerning the opposition of these forces, he has to know where he
himself stands. In other words, he must know what he wants’ (Frankfurt 1999b, 100).
Once a person is wholehearted, Frankfurt describes it as being ‘. . . tantamount to the enjoy-
ment of a kind of self-satisfaction . . . a state of satisfaction with the condition of the self . . .’
(Frankfurt 1999b, 102). The satisfaction that Frankfurt has in mind is not narcissistic or
enthusiastic, it is just ‘. . . an absence of restlessness or resistance . . .’ (Frankfurt 1999b,
103–4).
3. Why Frankfurt’s analysis is flawed
Although Frankfurt’s work has the merits of taking on the phenomenon of ambivalence
directly, his analysis contains a serious ambiguity between identifying and willing. This
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ambiguity needs to be sorted out in order to accurately locate the phenomenon of ambiva-
lence and in order to differentiate it from other conflicts of the will.
The ambiguity
To begin, consider Frankfurt’s analysis of freedom of the will. In his 1971 seminal paper,
‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Frankfurt argued that what makes us
persons is the ability to reflect on our desires; to form ‘second-order desires’. For
example, a smoker may desire a cigarette, but she does not want to want to smoke the ciga-
rette because she is trying to quit. The smoker has a ‘first-order desire’ to smoke, but does
not have a ‘second-order desire’ to smoke. Frankfurt argues that the smoker’s will is not
free, because a person’s will is free only when her first order desires are in accord with
her second order desires. The smoker who is trying to quit does not identify with her
first order desire to smoke the cigarette; she views it as outlaw (Frankfurt 1988a, 14–6).
On this account, freedom of the will requires an agent somehow to identify with, as
opposed to outlaw, the desires that she has. Frankfurt describes the range of ways that an
agent can identify with a desire: to identify with a desire is to ‘acknowledge that satisfying
it is to be assigned some position in my preferences’; it may be that the desire doesn’t please
me or make me proud, but I am ‘willing to have it represent me’; I ‘accept it’; I make ‘no
determined effort to dissociate myself from it’; in ‘weary resignation’ I ‘consent’ to having
it and to being influenced by it (Frankfurt 2006, 8).2 Or, I could identify more strongly with
the desire and regard it with ‘welcoming approval’, or even feel like not having that desire
would be ‘unthinkable’ (Frankfurt 1988c, 177–90; Frankfurt 1998, 26–7).
On the other hand, to view a desire as outlaw is described by Frankfurt in the following
range of ways: I feel like I am a ‘bystander’ to it; it ‘disturbs’ me; it makes ‘no sense’ to me;
I’d ‘never think of acting on it’; it has ‘no recognizable warrant’; it ‘happens to me/enters
my mind’; it feels ‘oddly disconnected’ from me or even ‘dangerously antithetical’; it is an
‘unacceptable intruder’; I feel an ‘anxious disposition to resist it’; it is ‘outlawed and dis-
enfranchised’; ‘I refuse to recognize it as grounds for what I think and do’; I treat it as ‘cat-
egorically unacceptable’ and try to ‘suppress it or rid myself of it entirely’; regardless of
how insistent it may or how powerfully moved by it I am I ‘give it no rational claim’; I
am ‘determined to give it no position at all’ in the order of my preferences (Frankfurt
2006, 9–10).3
If the outlawed desire succeeds in defeating our attempts to resist it, then ‘. . . the outlaw
imposes itself upon us without authority, and against our own will. This suggests a useful
way of understanding what it is for a person’s will to be free’ (Frankfurt 2006, 14). So far, it
seems that, for Frankfurt, a person is acting with free will so long as she is acting on one of
the desires that she identifies with (and not acting on one that she views as outlaw).
But, in other places in Frankfurt’s work, it seems as if something more specific is
required for freedom of the will: in order for a person to enjoy freedom of the will, she
must choose a particular desire, out of the set that she identifies with, to be effective in
action. That desire is then said to be the one that she ‘wills’. For example, Frankfurt
says: ‘It is not merely that he wants the desire to X to be among the desires by which, to
one degree or another, he is moved or inclined to act. He wants this desire to be effective
– that is, to provide the motive in what he actually does . . . want the desire to X not merely
to be one of his desires but, more decisively, to be his will’ (Frankfurt 1988a, 15). So then,
the picture is something like this:
On this reading of Frankfurt, freedom of the will consists not merely in having and
acting on desires that an agent identifies with, but in having and acting on the desire that
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the agent (more narrowly) wills (wants to be effective in guiding action). Freedom of the
will consists in an orderly arrangement. Passages in Frankfurt’s most recent essay,
‘Taking Ourselves Seriously’, lend support to this reading that freedom of the will consists
in an orderly arrangement of first-order desires (i.e. structure and harmony). Frankfurt
says: ‘The volitional unity in which the freedom of the will consists is purely structural’
(Frankfurt 2006); ‘When we are acquiescent to ourselves, or willing freely, there is no con-
flict within the structure of our motivations and desires’ (Frankfurt 2006); ‘Willing freely
means that the self is at that time harmoniously integrated’ (Frankfurt 2006); and ‘This
would amount to an inner harmony that comes to much the same thing as having a free
will’ (Frankfurt 2006, 17–9).
The ambiguity in Frankfurt’s account of freedom of the will leads to a similar ambiguity
in his analysis of the phenomenon of ambivalence. At times, Frankfurt writes as if ambiva-
lence occurs at the level of identification, and at other times he writes as if it occurs at the
level of identification plus willing (at the level of ordering the desires that the person ident-
ifies with). In support of the former reading of Frankfurt’s analysis of the phenomenon of
ambivalence, consider the following passage: ‘A person is ambivalent, then, only if he is
indecisive concerning whether to be for or against a certain psychic position’ (Frankfurt
1999b, 99). It is not that the agent has decided that she identifies with the desire and
approves of it being among her motivations, but just cannot decide whether she wants it
or other desires that she identifies with to move her to action right now. The agent
cannot even decide whether she identifies with the desire in question at all. Similarly,
about the ambivalent agent, Frankfurt says: ‘He is inclined in one direction, and he is
inclined in the contrary direction as well; and his attitude toward these inclinations is
unsettled. Thus, it is true of him neither that he prefers one of his alternatives, nor that
he prefers the other, nor that he likes them both equally’ (Frankfurt 1999b, 100).
At other times, however, Frankfurt writes as if ambivalence occurs at the level of
willing; that it is a failure of the agent to order her desires and decide which of them she
wants to be effective in action at a particular time. In other words, he writes as if ambiva-
lence occurs when an agent likes or dislikes both alternatives equally (contra the above
quote), and cannot decide which to prioritize, or which to be effective in action at a particu-
lar time. Frankfurt writes, to overcome ambivalence, an agent should ‘. . . give up trying to
have things both ways and find some coherent order . . .’ (Frankfurt 1999b, 107). The
ambivalent agent has a conflict among the desires that she identifies with and has trouble
ordering them, i.e., deciding which of the conflicting desires she wants to be effective in
action at a particular time.
Now that the ambiguity in Frankfurt’s account is exposed, the ambiguity can be turned
into a distinction (between willing and identifying), that can allow us not only to understand
the phenomenon of ambivalence better, but also to understand its relationship to other con-
flicts of the will. For example, if ambivalence is understood as a failure or a trouble at the
level of deciding which desire the agent wants to be effective in action at a particular time
(i.e. of willing), then one way that weakness of will might be understood is that an agent has
decided which desire she wants to be effective in action but acts not on that desire, but on
another desire that she identifies with (but does not more narrowly will). If, on the other
hand, ambivalence is understood as a failure to decide whether a desire is one that the
agent identifies with or views as outlaw, then one way that weakness of the will might
be understood is that an agent has decided which desires she in some sense identifies
with and which she views as outlaw, but has acted on a desire that she has outlawed. More-
over, understanding ambivalence in will versus identification will be an important distinc-
tion to keep in mind when theorizing about how to resolve it. Suggested methods of
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resolution may vary greatly if the problem is one of forming a psychic attitude towards a
desire or one of ordering desires.
4. New analysis
Locating ambivalence
The above discussion of the ambiguity in Frankfurt’s analysis of the phenomenon of
ambivalence is not purely negative, for we can sort out the ambiguities and develop an
alternative analysis of the phenomenon.
Referring to Figure 1, ambivalence can occur during the first decision process (of
whether or not to identify with or reject a particular first order desire). Ambivalence can
also occur during the second decision process, i.e. when an agent is deciding which
desire (of the desires she identifies with) she wants to be effective in action at a particular
time. Hence, ambivalence can be either a failure/trouble to form a psychic position towards
one’s desires (to identify or outlaw) or a failure/trouble to order one’s desires (to form a
will). Indeed, there are many cases where an agent identifies with desires where the satis-
faction of one negatively affects the satisfaction of another, and as a result has trouble order-
ing those preferences.4 Consider the literary example of Agamemnon. In Aeschylus’s play
Agamemnon, Agamemnon is faced with the conflict of whether or not to kill his daughter
Iphigenia in order to spare the lives of his cavalry. The anguish of his mental conflict can be
felt in his words (Aeschylus 2008):
A heavy doom, sure, if God’s will were broken;
But to slay mine own child, who my house delighteth,
Is that not heavy? That her blood should flow
On her father’s hand, hard beside an altar?
My path is sorrow wheresoe’er I go.
Shall Agamemnon fail his ships and people,
And the hosts of Hellas melt as melts the snow?
They cry, they thirst, for a death that shall break the spell,
Figure 1. Identifying and willing.
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For a Virgin’s blood: ’tis a rite of old, men tell.
And they burn with longing.— O God may the end be well!
Agamemnon has two desires, to spare the life of his daughter and to spare the lives of his
cavalry. It is not as if Agamemnon is having a problem forming a psychic attitude towards
those desires; he is not having a problem deciding whether he identifies with both desires or
views them as outlaw. He does identify with both. The problem that Agamemnon is having
is one of ordering his desires; of deciding which desire he wills to be effective in action at
this particular time.
Consider another example of an agent experiencing ambivalence: an agent is ambiva-
lent about having children. The agent has a desire to raise children (and raise them well) and
is not having a problem deciding whether he identifies with that desire or views it as outlaw;
he identifies with it (he wants to assign it some position among the motivations and causes
of his behavior). But the agent also has a desire to devote himself intensely to his career. He
also identifies with that desire, but knows that the satisfaction of it conflicts with the satis-
faction of his desire to raise children well, and so is having a problem deciding which of the
two desires he wants to move him to action. His ambivalence is a case of a failure to order
desires (a failure of willing) and not a failure to form a psychic position about a desire (a
failure of identifying).
Ambivalence as a structure of the will
Thus far, I have clarified an ambiguity in Frankfurt’s account about the location of ambiva-
lence, and have argued that cases of ambivalence can be located not just in the realm of
identifying, but also in the realm of willing. Another important conceptual issue that
must be addressed is whether ambivalence is to be construed as a feeling that an agent
has or as a structure of an agent’s will. Frankfurt defines ambivalence as a structure of
the will, as I explained in the section on Frankfurt’s analysis of ambivalence. I essentially
agree with Frankfurt’s analysis on this point, but an important objection needs to be
addressed. Some might object that ambivalence is fundamentally a feeling, the feeling of
being torn and conflicted, just as love and anger are fundamentally feelings. It would
seem odd for love or anger to be defined as anything but a feeling; it would be as if we
as outsiders could insist that someone was not really angry or in love because they did
not behave a certain way. It would be similarly odd to define ambivalence as anything
but a feeling.
In response, this objection has some merit, for there is an affective component to
ambivalence just as there is to love and anger. But there is a danger in making the affective
component the, or part of the, necessary and sufficient conditions for ambivalence for two
reasons: (1) we then face a conceptual difficulty of counterexamples where an agent (e.g. a
zombie, or an anthropologist fromMars) has the structure of the will for ambivalence, looks
like she is ambivalent, but lacks the affective component; (2) it becomes difficult to differ-
entiate ambivalence from other conflicts, such as temptation and regret, that might feel very
similar to the agent experiencing them. So, in order to accommodate the objection that there
is some affective component tied to the phenomenon of ambivalence, but avoid the difficul-
ties involved in making an affective element the, or part of the, necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for ambivalence, I suggest that ambivalence is fundamentally a certain structure of
the will (conflict of second order desires) that is ‘necessarily-typically’ accompanied by a
certain affective element (the feeling of being torn). That is, the affective component is
necessarily part of it, but it does not have to occur in all genuine cases; it merely has to
28 J.S. Swindell
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typically occur. I borrow the term ‘necessarily-typically’ from Berys Gaut in his article,
‘The Paradox of Horror’ (Gaut 1993). Gaut argued that although it may seem paradoxical
that some of us enjoy horror (i.e. enjoy unpleasant emotions such as fear and disgust), it is
not a paradox at all because emotions are essentially evaluations (in the case of horror, nega-
tive) which can feel either pleasant or unpleasant (in the case of horror, pleasant). He recog-
nizes that negative emotions (evaluations) are usually tied to unpleasant feelings and so he
argues for a conceptual connection between the evaluation and the feeling that he calls
‘necessarily-typically’. Negative emotions ‘necessarily-typically’ produce unpleasant feel-
ings, in the same way that pain ‘necessarily-typically’ produces avoidance behavior.
Two degrees of ambivalence
Thus far, I have characterized ambivalence as a structure of the will in which there is either a
difficulty in forming of second order positions (identifying or outlawing) or a difficulty
ordering second order desires (willing), that necessarily typically causes the agent to feel
torn. Ambivalence of both types comes in degrees.
The most severe degree, I call paralyzing ambivalence. The difficulty of a decision is so
paralyzing that the agent does not form a will at all; she does not decide which of her desires
she wants to be effective in action at a particular time (think of Agamemnon in the phase of
paralysis). A less severe degree of ambivalence I call residual ambivalence. The agent does
form a will but is still drawn towards the other desires that conflict with the desire that she
wills. I will discuss each degree of ambivalence in turn.
As an example of a case of paralyzing ambivalence, consider the following: Mr. X, a
youthful 70 year old man, was involved in a head on motor vehicle accident. As a result,
he lay in a hospital bed, on a ventilator, and paralyzed from the neck down. Mr. X had
to decide whether to have the ventilator withdrawn and die, or remain on the ventilator,
living a life on a ventilator and paralyzed from the neck down. Mr. X’s family, physicians,
and an ethicist all talked with Mr. X to try to ascertain what he really wanted. These con-
versations spanned over weeks, but Mr. X did not know what he really wanted. He could
not decide which of his desires (his desire to live or his desire to avoid living a life paralyzed
and on a ventilator) he wanted to be effective in action; he could not form a will; he was
paralyzingly ambivalent.
The severity of ambivalence found in paralyzing ambivalence is usually the result of
having to decide between making a full commitment to one thing or another, and a compro-
mise is not obvious or available because one commitment excludes acting on the other.
When an agent, such as Mr. X, is paralyzingly ambivalent (referring once again to the
diagram below), he experiences a conflict among the desires that he identifies with and
does not settle on which of those desires he wants to be at the top of the order; to be effective
in action at a particular time. In the case of Mr. X, he has a desire to live that he identifies
with, and a desire to live a certain quality of life that he identifies with, and the satisfaction
of those two desires conflict in this particular instance. Mr. X does not decide on the order-
ing of those desires; his ambivalence is paralyzing in that he fails to form a will.
While paralyzing ambivalence is a structure of the will in which there is a difficulty in
forming second order positions (identifying or outlawing), or a difficulty in ordering second
order desires that (1) necessarily typically causes the agent to feel torn and (2) results in the
agent failing to form a will, there is another degree of ambivalence that I call residual.
Residual ambivalence is a structure of the will in which there is a difficulty in forming
second order positions (identifying or outlawing), or a difficulty in ordering second order
desires that (1) necessarily typically causes the agent to feel torn or uneasy, but (2) does
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not result in the agent failing to form a will. The agent does form a will but is still drawn
towards the other second order desires that conflict with the desire that she wills. Imagine
the following example: Chris and John are engaged to be married and have a young child
together. John was raised Catholic, but has not seriously practiced his religion since his
teens. Lately however, John has been rekindling his relationship with the Church and
over the past few months he has begun to experience a deep feeling that he is being
called to become a priest. John has a desire to marry Chris and share a life with Chris
and their daughter, but he also has a desire to become a priest. Both desires are ones that
he identifies with in that he in some sense endorses them as being among the influences
on his behavior. After some time and inner turmoil, John makes a decision and forms a
will. He commits to his desire for a life with Chris and their daughter being the one that
is effective in action.
One question that may arise is that it is not clear what it means to simultaneously form a
will (decide which desire is to be effective in action at t1) yet still be strongly drawn towards
conflicting alternatives (that one also identifies with). This question arises from the differ-
entiation between types of ambivalence that I have provided, and from the distinction
between willing and identifying that I have drawn. It is an important and interesting ques-
tion about the particular phenomenon of residual ambivalence, and although addressing it
fully would require a separate paper on residual ambivalence alone, I will provide a prelimi-
nary response. To form a will in cases of residual ambivalence is to resign oneself to a
certain ordering of one’s desires, and to take steps towards making the desire that has
been ordered primary effective in action. Now, taking steps towards making the primary
desire effective in action can mean small and gradual steps. For example, whenever John
feels like looking at the webpage for priests he redirects his thoughts to something else.
Whenever he begins to miss his deep involvement with the Church, he reminds himself
of what he would be losing in pursuing that option. John begins therapy with Chris to
make their relationship even better and more attractive. John is, however, residually
ambivalent. He is still drawn towards (and at times strongly drawn towards) his desire to
become a priest, especially when he drives by a church or sees a book on Catholicism
while he is browsing at his local bookstore.
Ambivalence vs. regret
Analysis of ambivalence sheds light on a related phenomenon: regret. Ambivalence, of the
residual degree in particular, bears some relation to regret. There are, however, two different
sorts of regret to be discussed: (1) an agent regrets how she ordered her desires, or (2) an
agent regrets that she had to order her desires; that the satisfaction of some conflicted with
the satisfaction of others. The former type of regret is directed towards the agent herself, the
latter type of regret can be directed towards oneself or towards the world. The type of regret
that is most likely to be associated with the phenomenon of residual ambivalence is the
latter. Referring back to the case of John the would-be priest, it is not that he regrets that
he decided that he wanted his desire for a relationship with Chris to be effective in
action instead of his desire to become a priest. The regret that John may experience is
directed towards the world, it is regret that he could not have both desires satisfied.
To complicate matters, there is a way in which regret may be directed towards the self,
but not be regret about how the agent ordered her desires. If the decision that the agent made
about the ordering of her desires involved other persons, then the agent may regret that she
did harm to those persons (even though she does not regret her ordering). For example, if
ambivalent Agamemnon finally chose (as he did) his army over his daughter, then it is too
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simple to describe his regret as towards the world, as regret that he could not save both Iphi-
genia and his army. Agamemnon may regret doing wrong to Iphigenia. It may be more
accurate to describe his regret as directed towards her and not towards the world or the cir-
cumstances. All of this is just to point out, however, that the phenomenon of ambivalence
has some relation to the phenomenon of regret, but that they are not the same thing.
Ambivalence vs. weakness of will and temptation
Another common type of conflict of the will is temptation, which if succumbed to becomes
weakness of will. Recall that Frankfurt differentiates ambivalence from temptation in the
following way: in the case of temptation, the conflict is between the agent/the desires
that she identifies with and the desires that she views as outlaw. In ambivalence,
however, the conflict is in the agent. Frankfurt is partly correct in his distinction between
ambivalence and temptation. Temptation can be a conflict between the desires that the
agent identifies with and the ones that she views as outlaw, but temptation can also be a
conflict between the desire that the agent wills (the one that she wants to be effective in
action at t1) and the other desires that she identifies with. Hence, an agent is weak of
will when she acts on a desire other than the one that she wills. This other desire can
either be one that she views as outlaw or one that she identifies with. For example, I
may decide that I do not identify with my first order desire to eat ice cream for dinner,
but the desire to eat ice cream for dinner continues to influence me; it tempts me. I
succumb to it and eat ice cream for dinner; I am weak of will. Or, I may decide that I do
identify with my desire to eat ice cream for dinner, but on this particular evening I do
not will it. I have another desire that I identify with that conflicts with it (e.g. I am on a
health kick right now and have a desire to be healthy, and I ate ice cream for dinner last
night). The desire to be healthy is the one that I will; it is the one that I want to be effective
in action this evening. The desire to eat ice cream for dinner tempts me and if I succumb to it
I am weak of will, even though it is a desire that I identify with. These cases of temptation/
weakness of will are different from a case of ambivalence, where I am not able to decide
whether I identify at all with my first order desire to eat ice cream for dinner (whether I
assign it some position), or (more likely) where I am not able to decide what I will this
evening (whether I want my second order desire for health or my second order desire for
ice cream to move me to action this evening).
One objection is that on my analysis, temptation/weakness of will cannot be distin-
guished from residual ambivalence. I have said that if a desire other than the one that I
will influences me (even if it is a desire I identify with), then that is a case of temptation.
Yet, cases of residual ambivalence just are cases where desires that I identify with continue
to influence me. So, it is true that on my analysis all cases of residual ambivalence are cases
temptation. The difference between the two phenomena, however, is that not all cases of
temptation are cases of residual ambivalence (since I have argued that temptation also
occurs when an agent is influenced by desires that she views as outlaw). On my analysis
it is also true that cases of residual ambivalence are also cases of temptation and may
very easily turn into cases of weakness of will. For if the agent acts on a desire other
than the one that she wills (even if it is a desire that she identifies with), then she is
weak of will. Return to the case of the man who wills to remain with his fiance´e and
their daughter, but is residually ambivalent in that he is still strongly influenced by his con-
flicting second order desire to become a priest. He is tempted by his desire to become a
priest, and if he abandons his fiance´e and runs off to become a priest then he is weak of
will, even though his desire to become a priest is one that he identifies with.
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Ambivalence vs. indifference
Ambivalence is not to be confused with indifference. Here, Frankfurt is entirely correct.
Consider the following quote by the character Meursault in Albert Camus’s The Stranger
(Camus 1989, Part 1, Chapter 4):
She was wearing a pair of my pajamas with the sleeves rolled up. When she laughed I wanted
her again. A minute later she asked me if I loved her. I told her it didn’t mean anything but that I
didn’t think so. She looked sad. But as we were fixing lunch, and for no apparent reason, she
laughed in such a way that I kissed her.
Meursault does not reject his desire for Marie, nor does he endorse it. He is not ambivalent, for
he is not experiencing strong feelings drawinghim in conflicting directions.He iswhatwemight
call, indifferent. To be indifferent to one’s ownmotives is to, as Frankfurt says, ‘. . .take no eva-
luative attitude toward the desires that incline him to act. If there is a conflict between those
desires, he does not care which of them proves to be themore effective. In other words, the indi-
vidual does not participate in the conflict’ (Frankfurt 1988b, 164). This type of indifference we
might call, borrowing from Frankfurt, ‘wanton indifference’ (Frankfurt 1988a, 18).
Another type of indifference (one that Frankfurt does not discuss) is someone who does not
even have first order desires that incline him to act one way or the other. There is no conflict
between the desires that incline him to act (first order desires) because he does not even have incli-
nations one way or the other. Imagine that an agent has to decide whether to spend the day at the
beach or the park – those are his only twooptions. The agent is indifferent aboutwhere he spends
the day in the sense that he does not have a first order desire inclining him to spend the day at the
beach, nor does he have a first order desire inclining him to spend the day at the park. This type of
indifference we might call ‘first order indifference’, or more colloquially depression or lack of
motivation. Both wanton indifference and first order indifference are distinguished from
ambivalence by the fact that in cases of indifference, there is no conflict of the will at all.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, internal conflict comes in various forms. In this paper, I have provided an
analysis of one of the more neglected forms of internal conflicts: ambivalence. I have
argued that Frankfurt’s account of ambivalence contains an ambiguity between identifi-
cation and willing. I turn this ambiguity into a distinction, and use it to develop an analysis
of the phenomenon of ambivalence that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities to which
Frankfurt’s analysis is prey. I argue that ambivalence is a structure of the will in which
there is either a difficulty in forming second order positions (identifying or outlawing) or
a difficulty ordering second order desires (willing), that necessarily typically causes the
agent to feel torn. I hope that the conceptual clarifications that I have made contribute to
a better understanding of the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for dis-
cussions about the merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on auton-
omous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence in cases where ambivalence has
significant negative consequences for an agent.
Notes
1. See, for example, Bratman (1999); Bratman (2002); Bratman (2003); Calhoun (1995); Christman
(1991); Christman (1993); Ekstrom (1993); Ekstrom (2005); Velleman (2002); Greenspan
(1980); Harrist (2006) and Koch (1987).
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2. See Frankfurt (2006, 8). The exact quote is as follows (emphasis original): ‘When we consider
the psychic raw materials with which nature and circumstance have provided us, we are some-
times more or less content. They may not exactly please us, or make us proud. Nevertheless,
we are willing for them to represent us. We accept them as conveying what we really feel,
what we truly desire, what we do indeed think and so on. They do not arouse in us any determined
effort to dissociate ourselves from them. Whether with welcoming approval, or in weary resig-
nation, we consent to having them and to being influenced by them. This willing acceptance
of attitudes, thoughts, and feelings transforms their status. They are no longer merely items
that happen to appear in a certain psychic history. We have taken responsibility for them as auth-
entic expressions of ourselves’.
3. See Frankfurt (2006, 9–10). The exact quotes are as follows: ‘Sometimes we do not participate
actively in what goes on in us. It takes place, somehow, but we are just bystanders to it. There are
obsessional thoughts, for instance, that disturb us but that we cannot get out of our heads; there
are peculiar reckless impulses that make no sense to us, and upon which we would never think of
acting; there are hot surges of anarchic emotion that assault us from out of nowhere and that have
no recognizable warrant from the circumstances in which they erupt’. And ‘By a kind of psychic
immune response . . . we dissociate ourselves from them, and seek to prevent them from being at
all effective . . . this means that we deny them any entitlement to supply us with motives or rea-
sons. . ..Regardless of how insistent they may be, we assign their claims no place whatever in the
order of preferences and priorities that we establish for our deliberate choices and acts’.
4. An agent may be unambivalent about the first decision (whether or not the desire is one that she
identifies with), she may even be unambivalent about the second decision in that she wants either
desire 1 or 2 to move her to action at t1 but not desire 3 or 4. What she is ambivalent about is
whether she wants desire 1 or desire 2 to move her to action at t1. For example, imagine that
a person is unambivalent that she identifies with her desire to go to the beach, her desire to go
the park, her desire to go to the bookstore, and her desire to have sex. She is even unambivalent
that she wants either the desire to go to the beach or the park this afternoon. What she is ambiva-
lent about is whether she wants her desire to go to the beach or her desire to go to the park to be
the one that is effective in action this afternoon. This footnote arises from Geoffrey-Sayre
McCord encouraging me to reflect on the way that dividing up desires affects the classification
of ambivalence during an informal conversation upon his visit to Michigan State University in
June 2007.
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